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Abstract
With an emphasis on contributing to macroeconomic pedagogy we
examine the collateral multiplier by comparing it to the traditional
money multiplier in a simplified framework of traditional banking and
shadow banking in which government bonds are the core assets. While
the money multiplier is a measure of the ability of the banking system to intermediate sovereign debt by creating deposits, the collateral
multiplier is a measure of the shadow banking system’s ability to intermediate sovereign debt by creating shadow money. It also measures
the degree of re-use of sovereign debt as collateral. In this setup,
the collateral multiplier is defined as the ratio between dealer banks’
matched book repo activity relative to their trading book. Using the
New York Fed’s Primary Dealer Statistics data, we empirically estimate the collateral multiplier for U.S. Treasury repo collateral. Our
model and empirical results shed light on the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy channeled through shadow banks and on the U.S.
Treasuries market turmoil induced by COVID-19 in March 2020.
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Instructors of macroeconomics have traditionally included some discussion of how banks create money through the money multiplier process although recent changes in the curriculum as well as in the monetary system
itself (such as the ample reserve regime followed by the U.S. Fed) have made
this choice less attractive. This note is intended to provide a framework
for teaching how the modern banking system operates by using the money
multiplier as a prologue to understanding that the now-prevailing shadow
banking system generates new forms of money and presents monetary policymakers with new challenges. Hopefully, the framework will prove useful
to practitioners and economists who take an interest in the financial side of
macroeconomics as well.
Shadow banking can be defined as “money market funding of capital market lending” (Mehrling et al., 2013).1 A substantial amount of money market
funding for shadow banks takes place through the repo market where agents
exchange cash for collateral, usually Treasury debt and typically overnight
or for short term. Dealer banks, also called broker-dealers or investment
banks, use the repo market to fund the assets in their trading book. In addition, they provide funding to leveraged asset managers through reverse repos.
The collateral that dealers take in through reverse repos (“reverse in”) can
be re-pledged as collateral to borrow cash, or rehypothecated. Dealer banks
use rehypothecated collateral to provide “money market funding for money
market lending” to other shadow banking institutions through their matched
book repo operations.
Just as traditional banking dominated by depository institutions can be
usefully characterized by the money multiplier, the shadow banking system
can be characterized by a collateral multiplier. Fed economists using confidential survey data have reconstructed the collateral record (i.e., the accounts
showing sources and uses of collateral rather than the assets and liabilities
on a traditional balance sheet) for the major dealer banks in the U.S., and
calculated the collateral multiplier for recent years.2 Their estimates help
illuminate the sources of instability in the market for U.S. debt—the world’s
1

The capital market refers by convention to securities with maturities of one year or
more and the money market to short-term loans or securities with maturities of less than
one year.
2
Infante and Saravay (2020a) report their most recent results and Infante et al. (2020)
explain the methodology and theory of the collateral multiplier. For an explanation of the
relation between the collateral record and traditional balance sheet accounting, see Kirk
et al. (2014).
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largest security market—during the COVID-19 crisis of March 2020. They
document a decline in the multiplier that was subsequently reversed by the
aggressive open market operations of the Fed. In this note, we provide an
analytical framework for understanding the mechanisms through which balance sheet policies of the central bank operate in a world of shadow banks
by exploring the similarities and differences between the money multiplier
and the collateral multiplier. In addition, we also report our estimate of the
collateral multiplier associated with primary dealers’ repo and reverse repo
activities, utilizing New York Fed’s Primary Dealer Statistics. Because this
data is publicly available, our methodology could be used by instructors for
lectures or student projects.

1

Jimmy Stewart banking and the money multiplier

In order to see the relationship conceptually between the collateral multiplier and the money multiplier, it will be useful to begin with a model with
no shadow banks, so that the monetary system is dominated by traditional
depository institutions or Jimmy Stewart banks to use more colorful terminology.3 In this note, we will adopt the convention that bank and depository
institution are synonyms and later use the term dealer bank or just dealer
to refer to investment banks that do not issue deposits.
There are three agents or sectors in the Jimmy Stewart model: a monetary authority or central bank (m), a bank (b), and a household sector (h).
There are three assets: sovereign bonds (B), reserves (RE), and deposits (D).
Superscripts identify the agent holding a bond or other instrument. The central bank monetizes some of the supply of sovereign bonds by offering reserve
accounts to the bank, which in turn accepts deposits from households. Banks
are typically fractional reserve banks that maintain a reserve ratio, RE/D,
whose mathematical reciprocal is the money multiplier, µ, that is a staple
of many undergraduate textbooks: D = (D/RE)RE = µRE. The whole
3

Jimmy Stewart played George Bailey, the manager of a small bank in Bedford Falls
in the famous Frank Capra movie, “It’s A Wonderful Life.” He is a fitting symbol for
traditional banking. In a bold display of poetic license his little savings and loan experiences a bank run at a time in history when deposit insurance would have made that all
but impossible.
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Central Bank
B m RE

Bank
RE D
Bb

Household
D Jh
Bh

Table 1: Traditional Jimmy Stewart banking. Bonds are represented by B, reserves by RE, deposits by D and net wealth by J h .
system is best visualized by a set of interlocking balance sheets as in Table
1.
The household sector does no borrowing in this stripped-down set-up so
its net worth, J h , consists of its holdings of money and bonds. A natural
extension of the model adds loans to the private sector to the liability side of
the household balance sheet. The term household is just illustrative and the
sector could include corporate businesses or non-bank financial institutions.
It is customary to ignore bank capital (aka equity) in accounting exercises involving the T-accounts of a banking system. Presumably the banks
do generate a return on equity through the net interest margin between the
return on their assets and the cost of funding through deposits. The idealized
world portrayed here might represent the real world of U.S. banking immediately after World War II when commercial banks held sizeable amounts of
war debt in the form of Treasury bonds. It is also customary to emphasize
the role of new loans to the private sector in generating a money multiplier
but we have abstracted from that choice in order to keep the focus on the
parallel between the money multiplier under Jimmy Stewart banking and the
collateral multiplier under shadow banking.
The reserve ratio can be set by central bank policy but that is not necessary or even realistic.4 In many countries (including the U.S. after March
26, 2020), there is no official reserve ratio and banks find their own desired
ratio based on liquidity management practices. While in old textbooks and
in some banking systems (particularly in emerging market countries) reserve
ratios are used for conducting monetary policy, this has not been common
practice in the developed economies. We simply take the reserve ratio as
4

In practice, before the global financial crisis of 2008-09 the reserve ratio facilitated
control by the Fed over the overnight interbank market for fed funds. By maintaining a
controlled scarcity of reserves that forced the banks to trade funds in order for the system
to settle in the fed funds market, the Fed was able to manage the policy rate effectively
by injecting or draining reserves through overnight repo operations. This note is focussed
on balance sheet policies and leaves interest rate policy aside.
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fixed and ask how the credit system accommodates changes in the central
bank balance sheet. The money multiplier is a useful tool for framing the
answer. Importantly, like all accounting tools its causal structure is open to
alternative interpretations.
The money multiplier has drifted out of favor in macroeconomics (Carpenter and Demiralp, 2012), perhaps because of its association with oldfashioned monetarism, but that should not deter us from embracing it as a
useful statistic.5 Most modern macroeconomics treats the money supply as a
residual and regards money as effectively endogenous in a world where central
banks target interest rates (prices) and let quantities adjust. Yet Adrian and
Shin (2010) argue that in a world of shadow banking, monetary aggregates
(and, we will see, derivative statistics like the collateral multiplier) assume
increased significance, not so much for monetarist or quantity-theoretic reasons but because they register prevailing credit conditions, and we will try
to remain mindful of this perspective.
It is easy to show using the balance sheet identities that the money multiplier in a world of Jimmy Stewart banking expresses a ratio between monetized debt and the debt that is held by the banking system as a whole or
specializing to our model:
Bm + Bb
Bm
An open market operation, ∆B m , initiates a balance sheet adjustment
by the banks that creates or extinguishes their deposit liabilities. This is the
basis for the money multiplier. Textbook accounts usually assume that an
open market purchase will generate excess reserves that give rise to loans to
the private sector. Each new loan then creates a deposit elsewhere which
redistributes some of the excess reserves and generates yet more loans and
yet more deposits, thus creating a multiple deposit creation process. Yet
the same logic works in our model where excess reserves purchase bonds,
subject to the proviso that households own sufficient bonds to accommodate
µ=

5

The quantity theory of money proferred by monetarists asserts that the monetary
authority controls reserves and that reserves make loans and thus deposits; money is
exogenous. In a world of endogenous money, loans make deposits and reserves either
adjust or banks innovate to economize on existing reserves. This clash of visions is as old as
economics, going back before the Currency and Banking Schools of the nineteenth century.
Both visions agree on basic accounting principles so they offer alternative interpretations
of the causal structure of the money multiplier.
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a bank balance sheet expansion that generates an increase in deposits.6 If, for
example, the central bank buys a bond from a bank, the excess reserves that
result will be used to purchase a bond from the private sector, resulting in a
deposit and the migration of some excess reserves to another bank perhaps.
These reserves will also be used to purchase a bond, thus resulting in a
cascade of loans and deposits through a system of multiple banks. Yet the
logic works just as well if there is just one single “Wicksellian” bank on whose
books all transactions clear and settle.
The money multiplier can also be interpreted as a measure of the balance
between “outside money” (deposits that fund bank reserves) and “inside
money” (deposits that fund the bank’s securities holdings) in the manner
of Gurley and Shaw. This distinction is clearest when the banks lend to
the private sector, generating money that is inside because it transforms the
private liabilities of one agent into the assets of another. But sovereign bonds
are at some level the responsibility of the private sector which must pay taxes
to service them (we have abstracted from this), so they are in a sense being
transformed into inside money. Reserves, on the other hand, are outside
assets that are no one’s liability.
In this model, it is clear the money multiplier measures the ability of
the banking system to intermediate sovereign debt by issuing short term
liabilities (deposits) against its long term assets. If more sovereign debt is
held in the banks proper, open market operations have greater leverage over
the portfolios of households as a result of this maturity transformation. For
a given open market operation, ∆B m , we have:
∆D = µ∆B m

∆B h = −∆D

∆B b = (µ − 1)∆B m .

Notice that monetary policy works by forcing the households to rebalance
their portfolios (their net worth is held constant) which presumably will result
in the kind of asset market effects captured by the LM curve.7 The presence
6

If households own no bonds, an open market purchase will only allow for an increase
in deposits if the private sector is allowed to borrow from the banks, giving them an
asset to support lengthening of their own balance sheets. This is the traditional textbook
approach. Note that it requires a strong assumption that there is a robust demand for
new loans.
7
Many modern texts do not cover the LM curve these days since it assumes monetary
authorities target the money supply rather than the interest rate. For readers unfamiliar
with the LM curve, it represents asset market clearing, with L = M representing money
demand and supply. An increase in the supply of money and corresponding decrease in the
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of a banking system in effect amplifies these portfolio shifts, relative to a
baseline world with no maturity transformation performed by banks at all
(in which case the multiplier is just unity). In the case of a stimulative
open market purchase, this is because the banks are also buying bonds from
households (the last term above), thus increasing the amount of sovereign
debt that is monetized. In the case of a shortening of the central bank
balance sheet, the same logic works in reverse of course.
If we included loans to the private sector in the model, we would see
that monetary policy also works by freeing up or restricting the balance
sheet space of banks. An open market purchase of bonds from banks (or
households) frees up space for loans. This is a slightly different, possibly
complementary way of thinking about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, in this case through its direct quantity effects on the provision
of credit rather than through asset prices. This mechanism is sometimes
called the bank lending or credit channel in macroeconomics (Adrian and
Shin, 2010). The last equation in the list above could be modified to reflect
how the money multiplier expresses the capacity of banks to lend (assuming
banks hold only reserves and loans): ∆(LOAN S) = (µ − 1)∆B m .
The money multiplier is best understood as an accounting metric that
describes how a financial system generates liquidity given its main structural
elements, such as the bank reserve ratio, capital, and leverage.
If the banking system is not intermediating sovereign debt, the money
multiplier is unity. In this case, the bank is providing clearing and settlement
services, full stop. For purposes of constructing a model of a shadow banking
system, this is an appropriate abstraction that we take up in the next section.

2

Shadow banking and the collateral multiplier

The term shadow banking was apparently coined only a few years before the
global financial crisis of 2008-09 brought this new species of credit system
to our attention.8 Traditional banks originate loans to the private sector
supply of bonds should lower the market-clearing interest rate, all else equal. An increase
in the level of output, holding asset supplies constant, should result in a higher interest
rate due to the increased transactions demand for money.
8
Paul McCulley is usually credited with this neologism when he was an economist at
PIMCO.
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and hold them to maturity, and indeed Jimmy Stewart’s character George
Bailey explains that business model better than most textbooks. Shadow
banks by contrast originate loans but then distribute (sell) them, typically
to investment banks which securitize a pool of loans (or other revenue stream
generators) and issue tranches of bonds to the capital markets. The credit
system provides capital market lending but relies heavily on money market
funding of the securities it creates.
Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the transition from the traditional
bank-centered credit system to shadow banking than the Federal Reserve’s
decision to compile and publish prevailing rates in the three most visible
segments of the repo market (tri-party, bilateral, and GCF). These repo
rates, including the Secured Overnight Funding Rate (SOFR) that has been
selected to become a reference rate in place of LIBOR, are closely watched
as became apparent during the money market turbulence of September 2019.
The fed funds market, once the center of attention, is now only one of several
money markets competing for the attention of monetary policy makers.9
We can model a shadow banking system by treating the banks as warehouse banks or narrow banks that hold reserves and issue deposit liabilities.
The banks perform the critical functions of clearing and settlement for the
shadow banking complex. The money multiplier is thus unity. In life, of
course, banks do hold sovereign debt securities, for example as a form of the
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) required by Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage
Ratio (LCR), as well as other assets including loans.
The household sector holds deposits and shadow bank deposits, S. It now
makes sense to think of the “household” sector as a cash portfolio manager
(cash PM) like an institutional cash pool.10 Shadow money takes the form of
shares, S, in an intermediary like a money market mutual fund, mf , which
invests cash in the repo market. This is the proximate source of money
market funding for the shadow banking system shown as the last row in
9
The model that follows abstracts from two features of the shadow banking system
that are significant: its global nature, and its extensive use of derivative instruments
like interest rate or exchange rate swaps. While the domestic system settles through the
repo market that we will highlight, the global eurodollar market settles through FX swaps.
Moreover, dealer banks make markets in derivative instruments by intermediating between
both sides of swap trades for example.
10
Pozsar (2011, 2014) describes how institutional cash pools have driven the rise of
shadow banking through their need for safe cash equivalents. The terms cash PM and risk
PM are also his.
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Central bank
B m RE

Bank
RE D

Household
D J
S

Hedge fund
B hf Rhf

Dealer bank
Bd
RT
d
RR RM

Money fund
RRmf S

Table 2: Shadow banking. Money market mutual fund shares are represented by
S, repo borrowing by R, and repo lending by RR, with T and M identifying the
trading book or the matched book. The dealer bank funds the asset manager,
Rhf = RRd . The money market mutual funds the dealer bank, Rd = RT + RM =
RRmf .

Table 2.
We represent repo borrowing with the symbol R and reverse repo lending
with the symbol RR. In repo borrowing, cash lenders receive securities as
collateral so that in the event of default on the cash loan they can sell the
collateral and recover their funds. In practice, repo borrowing is overcollateralized by an amount known as the haircut, which provides an extra margin of
safety for cash lenders. Indeed, there is a structure to haircuts, and in some
markets such as GCF Repo they are zero. We abstract from haircuts in our
model at the cost of ignoring the inherently hierarchical nature of money.11
At the heart of the shadow system lie the dealer banks, d. They are
market makers in the capital markets. As such, they hold an inventory of
bonds in their trading book and finance them with repo borrowing, B d = RT .
The dealer banks are also market makers in money markets, supplying reverse
repo funding, RRd , to the risk portfolio managers we will label hedge funds
(hf ) for concreteness. Dealers supply reverse repo loans to the risk PMs
by sourcing repo funds from the cash PMs. They run a matched book in
11

See Mehrling (2012) for insight into the hierarchical nature of money and credit. Some
repo lending is motivated by a desire to obtain a specific security, for example to cover a
short position, and in this case the interest rate (called a special repo rate) will lie below
the rate for repo trades where any security in a broad class such as Treasury bonds is
accepted (called general collateral or GC repo). We are assuming all trades take place in
this GC repo market. At the other extreme are securities lending trades, where cash is
the collateral and the haircut is often greater than one to protect the securities lender.
Securities lenders in effect then “rehypothecate” much of the cash collateral into the triparty repo market.
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repo, so we label dealer bank matched book borrowing RM = RRd = Rhf .
Total dealer repo is Rd = RT + RM . Obviously, shadow banking institutions
maintain accounts with the banks for clearing and settlement purposes but
we can abstract from those in what follows because their balances net out
in the transactions we cover. Repo lending and borrowing is short-term,
typically overnight, so positions are being rolled on a continuous basis.12
This schematic representation maps faithfully into real-world U.S. financial institutions. Dealer banks typically lend substantially to risk PMs, and
take in collateral that is eligible for rehypothecation. Much of this activity
takes place in the bilateral sponsored repo space where trades clear through
FICC on a “delivery versus payment” basis, but there is also a substantial
bilateral repo market which clears on the books of the dealers.13 Dealers
use the collateral in to raise funds in the tri-party repo market, mostly from
money market mutual funds.14 In tri-party repo, a custodian bank (Bank
of New York Mellon in the U.S.) settles trades, as well as provides various
other back-office services such as valuation or margining, but unlike GFC and
FICC DvP repo there is no CCP. Once the collateral originating in the bilateral repo market reaches the tri-party platform, the chain of rehypothecation
ends.15
Moreover, the Fed’s serial Quantitative Easing (QE) programs after the
global financial crisis of 2008 did rely heavily on purchases of U.S. Treasuries
from primary dealers and from the “household and nonprofit institution”
sector in the Financial Accounts of the U.S., which includes domestic hedge
funds and other leveraged asset managers, as Carpenter et al. (2015) report.
One important way in which this model departs from real-world structures is that it ignores intrasectoral trading among dealer banks. In practice,
12

Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) provides a detailed account of the repo market, including
the instrumentalities of matched book dealing.
13
One advantage of the FICC DvP repo platform is that dealers can net offsetting trades
since all trades are novated to FICC, making them nettable under GAAP rules. FICC acts
as a central clearinghouse or counterparty (CCP). Tri-party agents do not act as central
counterparties. Tri-party and sponsored repo are measured well but uncleared bilateral
repo remains statistically unreported.
14
Securities lenders are the other main source of funding in tri-party repo.
15
There is also an interdealer market attached to the tri-party platform, the GCF Repo
market, where non-primary dealers who don’t have ready access to tri-party repo can
borrow from primary dealers who do. This was the market where the stresses in the
shadow system first surfaced in the repo spikes of December 2018 and famously September
2019.
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collateral circulates within the dealer bank network through chains of rehypothecation. Thus, the matched book of the sector as a whole can exceed
the repo lending to the asset managers, or RRd > Rhf . We provide a formal
model of intrasectoral matched book trading in section 4. Another omission, stemming from our narrow-bank simplification, is that in practice large
money center commercial banks hold substantial reserves in excess of their
deposits and they play an important role in the repo markets, particularly
in the inter-dealer GCF repo segment. This became apparent during the
September 2019 repo spike that was widely discussed in the financial press.
When the dealer banks take long positions in securities that are eligible
for use as collateral, those securities are unencumbered. In our model, unencumbered collateral is hypothecated in repo borrowing to fund the trading
book of the dealers. This repo borrowing uses unrehypothecated collateral.
The dealers matched repo book, on the other hand, is entirely supported
by collateral sourced through reverse repo trades with asset managers and
then rehypothecated (making it encumbered).16 The collateral multiplier
proposed by Infante et al. (2020) is the ratio of the total repo liabilities of
the dealer banks to their unrehypothecated repo or
RT + RM
.
(1)
RT
One way of conceptualizing this accounting ratio is that it effectively
measures (one plus) the ratio of the dealer bank’s matched book to its trading
book.17 An alternative interpretation might be extended to the categories
of outside money (bonds held outright) and inside money (rehypothecated
bonds) that we applied to the traditional banking system.
c=

16

Some repo agreements may encumber collateral by design.
In reality, there are other sources and uses of collateral through securities financing
transactions, including securities borrowing, collateral swaps, prime brokerage loans, variation and initial margin for derivatives, customer shorts, and firm shorts. As an aside, it is
worth observing that the multiplier for non-Treasury collateral reported by Infante et al.
(2020) is considerably lower than the multiplier for Treasury securities. This is another
example of the hierarchical nature of money and credit that has been suppressed in the
model.
17
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3

The multipliers compared and contrasted

As Infante et al. (2020) point out, there is a parallel between the collateral
multiplier and the money multiplier. The shadow banking system generates
a money-like liability, dealer repo, using a base of securities held outright
that are analogous to bank reserves (base money) in the traditional banking
model. We can go a step further since the liquidity created through shadow
banking shows up on the balance sheet of the cash PM as shadow money, S.
And we can see by looking through the balance sheets that S = cB d .18
From this it follows that open market operations have opposite effects on
the two forms of money since
∆S = c∆RT = ∆Rd = −∆B m = −∆D.
Infante and Saravay (2020b) present one interpretation of the collateral
multiplier based on the length of the chain of rehypothecation, which we explore below in section 4. This is perhaps analogous to the textbook narrative
in which the money multiplier emerges through a series of loan-deposit-loan
transactions which distribute new reserves from bank to bank through the
banking system. But there is nothing about either multiplier that demands
this interpretation. It is indeed true that the same security can be and usually
is used as collateral in multiple repo trades simultaneously, but the collateral
multiplier is best seen as an accounting measure of the ability of the shadow
system to intermediate sovereign debt securities by creating shadow money,
just as the money multiplier measures the ability of a traditional banking
system to intermediate debt by creating deposits.19 It works just fine with
Wicksellian shadow banks and short chains of rehypothecation.
But there is a critical difference in how central bank balance sheet operations work in the two idealizations. Consider a reduction in the central bank’s
18

In practice, the shadow banking system creates shadow money by monetizing a range
of private assets, including various forms of asset-backed securities, so the shadow money
system is not limited by the dealers’ bond holdings, B d . In the Jimmy Stewart world, the
money supply is limited by the reserves injected by monetizing sovereign debt, B m = RE,
assuming a constant reserve ratio.
19
The minimal representative collateral chain might involve a non-primary dealer reversing in a Treasury in the bilateral repo market, rehypothecating that to raise funds
from a primary dealer, perhaps in the GCF Repo market, which then reuses/repledges it
in the tri-party market, for a total of two links.
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balance sheet, as in the reversal of QE called taper.20 In a Jimmy Stewart
world, this would drain reserves, reduce deposits, and effect a rebalancing
of household balance sheets toward bonds. For every dollar of open market
purchases, banks would need to sell off $(µ − 1) of bonds to households. The
policy works by shifting assets out of the banking system.
In a shadow banking world, reverse QE (selling bonds) works by shifting
assets out of the warehouse bank into the shadow banking system, putting
pressure on it to monetize the bonds that must be absorbed on the balance
sheets of dealers and risk PMs.21 The cash PMs experience taper as a forced
rebalancing of their portfolios, away from deposits and toward shadow money.
Indeed, in this stylized shadow banking model, the money supply consists
of the sum of deposits and shadow money, and it is unaffected by traditional
open market operations.22 The supply of money depends only on the (assumed fixed) supply of sovereign debt: D + S = RE + Rd = B m + B d + B hf .
In contrast to the traditional banking system, where the supply of money
depends on a specific form of state liability, central bank reserves, in an
idealized shadow banking world the supply of money depends on the total
liabilities of the consolidated government.23 This insight would of course
need to be modified in practice to account for sovereign debt held outside
the shadow banking complex.
Open market sales (taper) require the shadow bank complex to absorb
more bonds, and issue more shadow bank money. The collateral multiplier
measures how that absorption is distributed between the dealer banks and
risk PMs. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the collateral
multiplier has declined substantially over the period of large fiscal deficits
20

Strictly speaking, taper refers to reducing new purchases of bonds and letting the
existing stock of securities “run off” the balance sheet as they mature. The net result is
a smaller balance sheet.
21
See section 5.1 for a more detailed demonstration of the consequence of reserve QE in
a shadow banking world.
22
In the U.S., deposits and currency are captured by the M1 measure and retail money
market funds are included in M2. Institutional money market funds are reported as
a memorandum item and are not included in existing money measures; they had been
included in the discontinued series M3. In December 2020, the Fed reports total checkable
deposits to be about $4.1 trillion and money market funds (including institutional funds)
about $3.9 trillion.
23
In a sense, this model bears resemblance to the national bank era before the Federal
Reserve was created. New York banks and money center banks used Treasuries as reserve
assets, and country banks used deposits in money center banks for reserve purposes.

13

and tapering by the Fed, as the shadow system’s capacity to absorb securities
has been tested.24 It is also illuminating that the turbulence in the Treasury
market caused by the COVID-19 shock of March 2020 brought down the
multiplier further, since the shadow system was asked to digest a bolus of
U.S. sovereign debt being unloaded by central banks, corporations, and hedge
funds among others seeking to liquidate their bond holdings. Only after
the Fed reversed course and initiated open market purchases in size did the
multiplier begin to recover. In effect, the Fed used its balance sheet to
backstop the bond market by acting as dealer of last resort (Mehrling, 2010).
Two institutional features of the Basel III regulatory framework have
been particularly significant recently. The extended Supplementary Leverage Ratio, which limits the overall ratio of assets to bank capital for large
bank holding companies, has constrained banks and dealers alike in their
ability to take on more assets of any kind. The LCR, mentioned earlier, has
encumbered collateral and inhibited dealers’ ability to expand their matched
book operations. Our model abstracts from bank capital (equity) and leverage. It also abstracts from the unsecured money market where the HQLA for
dealer banks (US Treasuries) must be funded. Large bank holding companies include depository banks and dealer banks among their subsidiaries, and
subject to some restrictions can source liquidity internally. Taken together,
these restrictions suggest that the collateral multiplier is an important indicator of the balance sheet capacity of the shadow sector that might forewarn
policy makers of impending dangers.
From the point of view of macroeconomics, open market purchases are
putting pressure on the asset managers to take on more securities, presumably putting the same kind of pressure on asset markets (to raise prices and
lower yields) that traditional LM-curve reasoning emphasizes.25 But it is also
clear that open market purchases free up balance sheet in the shadow bank
complex and augment its ability to support capital market lending to the
private sector. An important point dramatized by the collateral multiplier
is that in our brave new world the bank lending channel of monetary policy
24

See section 6 where we report our measure of collateral multiplier. As can be seen,
the overall trend is similar to the one reported inInfante and Saravay (2020b).
25
QE and its unwinding are aimed at changing the slope of the yield curve, mainly
by affecting the term premia on longer duration bonds. Short term interest rates in
the modern developed-world financial system are managed through central bank standing
facilities, such as interest on reserves or central bank repo and reverse repo facilities. We
have abstracted from these in our model in order to focus on balance sheet policies.
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runs through shadow banks.26
So far, to better focus on the shadow banks, we have treated Jimmy
Stewart banks simply as warehouse banks or narrow banks by assuming the
money multiplier to be unity. We can relax this assumption and easily merge
the basic Jimmy Stewart banking model with the shadow banking model by
returning bonds to the balance sheet of the bank. As in section 1, as long
as the reserve ratio remains constant, deposits will be a constant multiple of
reserves, D = µRE = µB m and bonds will be B b = (µ − 1)B m . The total
amount of money created by this generalization will be D + S = µB m + B d +
B hf .
As before, an open market operation by the central bank reallocates
money between deposits and shadow money. The difference is that the money
multiplier amplifies the effects. To see this, start from the balance sheet of
the household or cash PM. With net worth constant, changes in deposits
must be exactly offset by changes in shadow money, ∆D = −∆S. An open
market purchase increases reserves and induces the bank to expand its balance sheet, buying bonds and multiplying deposits in the process. Because it
is sourcing bonds from the shadow bank complex, a given open market purchase results in a larger reduction in bond holdings of dealers and risk PMs
(hedge funds) than would have occurred with narrow banks and a money
multiplier equal to one. To be precise, the changes are
∆B m + (µ − 1)∆B m = µ∆B m = −(∆B d + ∆B hf ).
The distribution of changes in bond holdings between dealers and hedge
funds is, as before, determined by the collateral multiplier.27

4

Rehypothecation chains

Rehypothecation chains bear resemblance to the multiple endorsements that
characterized bills of exchange in pre-modern finance.28 However, the cred26

Adrian and Shin (2010) emphasize that the bank lending channel in the context of
shadow banks is more appropriately considered to be a risk-taking channel since dealer
banks respond to monetary easing by increasing leverage in order to take on more risky
assets.
27
From the change in deposits, we can work out the details: ∆B d = −(µ/c)∆B m and
hf
∆B = −(µ(c − 1)/c)∆B m .
28
The bill of exchange more than any other financial instrument underwrote the Industrial Revolution, but like its cousin the banker’s acceptance it dwindled in significance in
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itworthiness of a bill increases with the list of endorsers, while lengthening
a chain of rehypothecation raises the possibility of a cascade of settlement
failures (also known technically as “settlement fails”). Hence, some of the
interest in re-use of collateral stems from its possible role fostering financial
fragility.

4.1

A model of interdealer repo

As mentioned, the basic model of shadow banking ignores repo trades among
the dealer banks, which are important in practice. Here we provide some
modeling of the multiplier in relation to the length of the collateral chains–
i.e., the number of simultaneous repo trades supported by one security on
average. Infante and Saravay (2020b) offer a formal model of interdealer repo
that underwrites an interpretation of the collateral multiplier as a measure
of the average chain of rehypothecation. Their exposition leaves out some
mathematical details which we will provide using our own notation, dropping
identifying superscripts and subscripts that are irrelevant.
Their model assumes no outside source of collateral such as the hedge
funds in our basic model in section 2; all bonds are held by the system of
dealers. One dealer bank borrows from outside the dealer network (from the
money fund in our model), using as collateral its own bond holding, B1 , and
collateral reversed in from a second dealer, which is also holding a bond, B2 ,
using it and collateral reversed in to borrow from yet a third dealer, and so
on. Thus, the dealer system is structured like a series of Matryoshka dolls.
Assume all dealers in the system maintain the same collateral ratio, c =
Ri /Bi where R = RT + RM is total repo borrowing. Then dealer one’s
repo position is R1 = cB1 and its reverse repo to dealer two is R1 − B1 =
(c−1)B1 = R2 (recall that a reverse repo loan is booked as a repo liability for
the counterparty). Dealer two can thus finance B2 = (1/c)R2 = ((c−1)/c)B1 .
Continuing in this way through the dealer network, we can see that the total
amount of bonds held by the system will be:
B=

k
X
i=1

Bi = B1

i−1
k 
X
c−1
i=1

In the limit as k → ∞, this reduces to
the twentieth century.
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c

.

B = cB1 .
Notice that dealer one’s outright holdings of bonds are only hypothecated
once for a unit chain length. Dealer two’s outright holdings are reypothecated, for a chain length of two, and dealer three’s for a chain length of three,
etc. Infante and Saravay (2020b) propose a measure of the volume weighted
average collateral chain we will call λ:
λ=

k
X
iBi
i=1

B

.

Again, in the limit as k → ∞ we can substitute into this expression, use
B1 = B/c to simplify29 , and see that:
∞

1X
i
λ=
c i=1



c−1
c

i−1
= c.

Thus, in the idealization considered here, the collateral multiplier accurately measures the average collateral chain as the number of Matryoshka
dolls approaches infinity. However, the relation between bonds held outright
and shadow money created outside the dealer network is altered since only
dealer one borrows from an external source (the money fund) re-using all the
securities held by the network: S = R1 = cB1 = B.
Note that all this is consistent with our understanding that the multiplier
measures the ratio of matched book to trading book; in this model all the
matched book trading is with other dealers within the network. If we aggregate (without consolidation) over all the dealers, the total matched book
repo will be RM = R − B = (c − 1)B.
The consistency does not go in the other direction, however, because for a
small discrete network (with k a small integer), the value of λ will typically be
less than the collateral multiplier since the system will be unable to absorb
the full complement of bonds through nested repo. The kth bank has no
one to lend to, so it will fund its bondholdings with repo from the k − 1th
bank; it is effectively a hedge fund. For example, if c = 5 and B1 = 1, the
full complement of bonds is B = 5. With a discrete network, say k = 3,
we find that B1 + B2 = 1.8 and λ = 2.44, even though by assumption
29

ToPsee that the convergentP
series below equals c2 , subtract out the known convergent
i
series
((c − 1)/c) = c from
i((c − 1)/c)i−1 = A to find A = c2 .
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P
c = 5. However, with k = 10 we find 91 Bi = 4.33 and λ = 4.46, which is
getting us closer to 5. It would seem that this idealization is useful because
it dramatizes the role that interdealer trading plays in lengthening the chain
of rehypothecation and absorbing more bonds within the dealer network.
In this sense, it is intuitive that the collateral multiplier does convey some
information about chain length given sufficient circulation of collateral within
the dealer network. We return to the small discrete network below.
This model also illustrates the parallel between repo and deposit money
created by a traditional bank. Lending cash in a reverse repo is like depositing
cash in a Jimmy Stewart bank; rehypothecating the collateral is like writing
a check against a traditional deposit account. The repo/reverse trades within
the dealer network are generating a form of shadow money. The outright position of the dealer complex generates “outside” shadow money that escapes
the dealer network but the network itself generates “inside” shadow money
that remains within it.

4.2

A general model

The Infante-Saravay model can be generalized to describe a system with a
discrete number of rehypothecations, k. The basic model in section 2, for
example, is a special case with k = 2. The model in the previous section
describes an infinite series of rehypothecations. We can use the intermediate
cases in order to illustrate another measure of rehypothecation chains offered
by Singh (2011) and Singh (2017). Singh defines the “velocity” of collateral
as the ratio of total collateral received by dealers to collateral provided by
hedge funds and securities lenders (which are not considered here).30 In terms
of the basic model in section 2, this would by assumption be equal to unity,
V = RM /Rhf = 1, while in the Infante-Saravay model it would be undefined
since there is no collateral received from hedge funds.
Adding a network of interdealer repo to our basic model drives a wedge
between hedge fund borrowing and the size of the matched book since some
repo activity gets trapped within the dealer network. The amount of matched
book repo lending generated through intrasectoral trades is RRd − Rhf and
30

He also calls this the “reuse rate” of collateral. His terminology seems meant to invoke
a parallel with the velocity of money showing how many times a banknote turns over per
year, but Singh’s velocity does not have a time dimension so that parallel seems less than
accurate. What he is trying to capture is how many trades a security supports as collateral
at a point in time or the length of the collateral chain of rehypothecation.
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in this extended model taking into account intrasectoral repo Singh’s velocity
measure becomes
RM
RRd − Rhf
=
+ 1.
Rhf
Rhf
In other words, V measures the proportion of matched book repo that
is generated within the dealer network, which as we have seen does expand
as the average length of the rehypothecation chain, λ, and the number of
rehypothecations, k, rise. Singh (2017) reports that his velocity measure
declines sharply after the GFC, falling from 3.0 in 2007 to 1.8 in 2015. It is
important to be aware that as well as repo trades his data includes the whole
spectrum of securities financing transactions that bring collateral into dealer
banks, including securities lending, collateral swaps, customer shorts, prime
brokerage, and firm shorts. Still, this suggests that a fairly large amount of
rehypothecation takes place within the dealer network.
Curiously, increasing the length of the rehypothecation chain keeping c
constant does not affect the amount of shadow money held outside the dealer
network. This is because increasing k merely shifts bonds out of the kth bank
(which is effectively a hedge fund) onto the books of the dealers, without
affecting the amount of repo business with the money fund. Details are
provided in the appendix. It follows that the relationship between dealer
bond holdings and shadow money changes, going from S = cB d when k = 2
(our basic model) to S = B d as k → ∞. In this latter case, all the matched
book of the dealers is taken up by intrasectoral trades.
Interpreted through this extended model then, the collateral multiplier
expresses two different aspects of the shadow banking system. First, it reflects its role in generating money market funding for capital market positions
held by risk PMs and other asset managers. Increased activity in this space
(greater Rhf relative to the size of the dealers’ trading book) will raise the
multiplier, signalling an enhanced capacity to absorb sovereign debt just as
in the basic model. Second, it reflects the extent to which intrasectoral trades
generate a form of shadow money (repo) that remains within the dealer network through lengthened chains of rehypothecation (greater V or k). From
this perspective, Singh’s V unambiguously expresses variations in the extent
of collateral re-use if that is the object of interest.
V =
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Central bank
B m RE

Bank
RE D

Household
D
J hh
S

Hedge fund
Rhf
B hf
J hf

Dealer bank
RT
Bd
RM
RRd
Jd

Money fund
RRmf S

Table 3: Shadow banking extended to incorporate net worth, or equity, of the
hedge fund and dealer bank. The hedge fund’s equity and dealer bank’s equity are
represented by J hf and J d , respectively.

5

Extensions and applications

In order to understand more concrete environments in which the collateral
multiplier evolves in close relation to the central bank’s asset purchase programs and the shadow banks’ leveraging and deleveraging processes, let us
introduce equity for the risk PM and the dealer sector explicitly, denoting
former’s equity by J hf and the latter’s equity by J d . The sectoral balance
sheet is shown in figure 3. The risk PM’s bond holding is now financed by
equity and repo borrowing. Suppose the risk PM’s repo requires a haircut
hhf . Then for a given equity, the bond holdings of the risk PM are
B hf =

J hf
hhf

(2)

and its leverage ratio is31
B hf
(3)
J hf
The dealer sector’s positions in repo lending RRd and bonds B d are
funded by matched book repo and trading book repo, respectively, along
with equity J d . Suppose that the matched book repo borrowing has the
same haircut imposed on the risk PM’s repo borrowing so that RRd = RM
with B hf rehypothecated. On the other hand, the dealer’s bond holdings
are financed by trading book repo and equity. If the haircut on the dealer’s
λhf =

31
Note that a haircut sets a constraint on a leverage ratio. That is, the inverse of the
haircut is the maximum leverage ratio a borrower can have. In this regard, the expression
in equation (3) is the maximum leverage ratio for the risk PM.
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d

repo is hd , then with its equity, the bond holdings of the dealer are B d = Jhd .
Note that one portion of B d financed by RT is encumbered, while the other
financed by J d is unencumbered. The dealer sector’s leverage ratio is32
λd =

B d + RRd
.
Jd

(4)

The collateral multiplier is measured as
c=

RM + RT
.
Bd

(5)

To see how the dealer sector’s balance sheet capacity and the collateral multiplier change, below we examine a reverse quantitative easing and
deleveraging by the risk PM.

5.1

A reverse quantitative easing

In reverse QE, the central bank conducts an open market sale, ∆B m < 0. It
is absorbed by the dealer balance sheet funded by new trading book repo of
∆RT = ∆B d = −∆B m . The dealer balance sheet is expanded and so is the
cash PM’s by the same amount, ∆RRmf = ∆S = −∆B m .
Given the household’s equity (net worth), its portfolio rebalances from
deposits to shadow money by −∆D = ∆S. Since the open market sale
via the dealer is cleared by the warehouse bank, the latter’s balance sheet
shrinks by ∆RE = ∆D = ∆B m , which matches the size of the household
sector portfolio rebalancing.
The dealer sector’s leverage ratio is now higher at
λd =

B d + RRd + ∆RT
Jd

since ∆RT = −∆B m > 0.
This weakens the dealer balance sheet capacity and the collateral multiplier is now
RM + RT + ∆RT
c=
(6)
B d + ∆B d
d

By substituting B d = Jhd into equation (4) we can see that the leverage ratio is
inversely related to the haircut.
32
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which is lower than before since ∆RT = ∆B d = −∆B m > 0. Furthermore,
the dealer’ new, higher leverage ratio may not be sustainable from the regulatory perspective unless the leverage constraint such as the Supplementary
Leverage Ratio in the Basel III is relaxed, which is what the Fed did33

5.2

Deleveraging

One of the first things observed in the financial markets in the first week of
March 2020 was a Treasury sell-off, which is quite unusual since Treasury
bonds, considered as the safest asset, typically are the most demanded in
times of stress.34 Among many reasons for the Treasury market disruption,
one is the flight to quality, i.e. cash, with even Treasury bonds considered as
not liquid enough. Our model is limited in describing this phenomenon since
the bond is the safest and the most liquid asset in the model. Therefore, if the
bond sell-off takes place in the model, it would have to do with deleveraging
rather than the flight to quality.
Suppose the haircut on the risk PM’s repo borrowing increases, in which
case the risk PM is forced to deleverage; see equation (2). The risk PM
liquidates bonds, i.e. ∆B hf < 0, the size of which is determined by the new
haircut. The risk PM does this by ceasing to roll over its repo borrowing by
the same volume, i.e. ∆Rhf = ∆B hf , thereby repurchasing the corresponding volume of the collateral pledged in the repo transaction which is then
liquidated. The risk PM’s new leverage ratio is now
hf

λ

B hf + ∆B hf
=
J hf

(7)

which is lower than its initial level in equation (3) since ∆B hf < 0.
The reduction in the risk PM’s repo borrowing is reflected in a decline
in the dealer sector’s reverse repo and hence the matched book repo by
∆RRd = ∆RM = ∆B hf . The risk PM liquidates the repurchased collateral
to the dealer, which finances the extra position in the bond by expanding its
trading book repo by ∆RT = ∆B d = −∆B hf . As can be seen, the decrease
in matched book repo and the increase in trading book repo are the same
size of ∆B hf and hence exactly offset each other. Therefore, the dealer
sector’s leverage ratio remains the same.
33

In March 2020, the Fed exempted Treasuries from computing the Supplementary
Leverage Ratio, thereby relaxing the leverage constraint.
34
Reference: Duffie 2020, “Still the world’s safe heaven?”
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On the asset side, this is reflected in a portfolio rebalancing from reverse
repo to bonds, which undermines the balance sheet capacity of the dealer
sector. This can be seen from the fact that the collateral multiplier is now
lower at
RT + RM
c= d
(8)
B + ∆B d
since ∆B d = −∆B hf > 0.

6

Data

Infante and Saravay (2020a)’s estimation of the collateral multiplier uses
firm-level data of the FR 2052a Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring
Report, which presents comprehensive view of liquidity profiles of individual
financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve. However, FR 2052a
is considered confidential and hence not publicly available. Therefore, in this
section we present our estimate of the collateral multiplier relying on the Primary Dealer Statistics data published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.35 Included in the data set is weekly data of primary dealers’ incoming
and outgoing collateral, and within each group of collateral a distinction is
made between collateral from repo activities and that from other financial
activities such as security lending, margin borrowing, etc. However, as there
are some missing values for the collateral from the other financial activities
due to disclosure rules, we have estimated the collateral re-use of U.S. Treasuries in repo activities only. The period of analysis runs from January 2015
to May 2021.
To help explain our approach to using the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer
Statistics in constructing the time series of the collateral multiplier, figure 1
schematically organizes the components of the data set. There is incoming
collateral of Treasuries through reverse repo positions and there is outgoing Treasuries collateral through repo borrowing. The repo borrowings are
mostly overnight while the reverse repos are mostly term, including the maturities less than 30 days and those more than 30 days, implying that even
for shadow banking an interest rate spread is an important source of bank
profit.
35

The link is the following. https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/counterparties/primarydealers-statistics
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Figure 1: Sorting out trading book and matched book repo from the Primary
Dealer Statistics. This figure visualizes how we organized the incoming and outgoing repo data from the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer Statistics to identify
trading book repo and matched book repo. The difference between outgoing repo
and incoming repo corresponds to Treasuries held outright and hence trading book
repo, while the repo that finances incoming collateral corresponds to matched book
repo.
Treasuries held outright by the primary dealers and financed by repo borrowing, which is trading book repo, are not readily available from the data.36
We estimated the trading book repo by subtracting the total incoming Treasury collateral of all maturities from the total outgoing Treasury collateral of
all maturities. The rest of the total outgoing Treasury bonds is the matched
book repo. From this, the collateral multiplier can be measured according to
equation (1).
First, figure 2 plots the total flows of U.S. Treasury collateral for the
dealers associated with repo activity. It shows that primary dealers re-use
most of Treasuries through repos, which is in line with the result in Infante
et al. (2018), where the importance of repo for U.S. Treasury intermediation
is highlighted.
Next, figure 3 displays the total volume of outgoing Treasury through
repos and the total volume of non-rehypothecated Treasuries, i.e. U.S. Treasuries the primary dealers owned but financed through repos. According
to the definition presented in equation (1), the collateral multiplier is estimated by the ratio of these two, i.e. the ratio of the outgoing collateral to
non-rehypothecated outgoing collateral.
36

Other limitations of the NY Fed’s data set are that collateral related to derivatives
activity is excluded and that financing activities of U.K. broker-dealer subsidiaries of U.S.
bank holding companies are excluded. Nonetheless, these data provide a useful source to
roughly generate a general trend of collateral multiplier of the primary dealer network.
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The result is reported in figure 4 which shows that primary dealers have
been able to create up to five times as many repo liabilities backed by U.S.
Treasuries as they owned for the last six years. Note that there was a downward trend in the collateral multiplier starting from late 2015 through June
2019. This period corresponds to the Federal Reserve ending the seven years
of zero rate policy and gradually lifting the target range until reversing course
back in July 2019 through March 2020. See figure 5. In line with our analysis in section 5.1, during this period of reverse QE, the collateral multiplier
declined over time, and then in July 2019 as the Fed started to lower the
target again the collateral multiplier also started to rise.
A more recent episode of turmoil in Treasury markets in March 2020 is
also worth noting. To closely observe how the collateral multiplier reacted
to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, figure 6 separately charts it from
the last week of February 2020 to the first week of April 2020. Reflecting the
Treasury sell-off in the first weeks of March 2020, the figure exhibits a drop in
the collateral multiplier during this period. It corresponds to our analysis in
section 5.2 of hedge fund deleveraging through Treasury sell-offs leading to a
decline in collateral multiplier. Since the dealers absorb Treasuries dumped
in the market through repos, the trading book repo rises, undermining the
dealers’ balance sheet capacity, and hence the collateral multiplier falls. In
response, the Fed took swift action, among others, to purchase Treasuries
and agency mortgage-backed securities on a massive scale. According to
our analysis in section 5.1, the Fed’s asset purchase program will lead to
an increase in the collateral multiplier. The drastic bouncing back of the
collateral multiplier in the last two weeks of March 2020 reflects this account.

7

Summary

In this paper, we intentionally work with two idealized credit systems in
which government bonds are the core assets in order to facilitate comparison
between the traditional money multiplier and the collateral multiplier in a
shadow banking world. Real economies combine aspects of both idealizations
so presumably the insights have some practical value.
The money multiplier is a useful accounting measure of the structure of
a traditional banking model. We interpret it as a measure of the ability of
the banking system to intermediate sovereign debt by creating deposits; to
be precise, it measures the ratio of total sovereign debt held by the banking
25

Figure 2: U.S. Treasury Incoming and Outgoing Collateral Volumes. This figure
shows the total volume of incoming and outgoing U.S. Treasury collateral for
the primary dealers. (Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Primary Dealer
Statistics)
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Figure 3: U.S. Treasury Outgoing Repo. This figure shows, in addition to the
total volume of U.S. Treasury repo outgoing, the volume that was sourced from
the dealers’ outright holdings, i.e. non-rehypothecated. The collateral multiplier
reported in figure 4 is computed as the ratio between the dotted line and the solid
line. (Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Primary Dealer Statistics)
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Figure 4: Collateral multiplier for repo Treasury collateral. This figure shows our
estimate of the collateral multiplier for U.S. Treasury repo collateral computed as
the ratio between outgoing repo collateral to non-rehypothecated outgoing repo
collateral. (Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Primary Dealer Statistics)

Figure 5: Federal funds rate. This figure shows the target range of federal funds
rate and the effective federal funds rate. (Source: The website of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York)

28

Figure 6: Collateral multiplier for repo Treasury collateral in March 2020. This
figure shows the collateral multiplier in March 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic
started. (Source: New York Federal Reserve Bank, Primary Dealer Statistics)

system, including the central bank, and debt held by the central bank (i.e.,
monetized). The money multiplier has become somewhat obsolete as the
financial system has evolved.
In a modern shadow banking system defined by money market funding of
capital market positions, the collateral multiplier is a useful accounting measure. It measures the ability of the shadow banking system to create shadow
money, but in this idealized model open market operations shift assets into
or out of the shadow complex, rearranging the form in which money appears
(shadow money versus deposits) rather than changing the total amount. The
model elaborated here helps make sense out of the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy channeled through shadow banks, as well as shedding
light on prominent events such as the turbulence in the U.S. Treasuries market induced by COVID-19 in March 2020. The collateral multiplier can be
understood generally as a measure of the size of dealer banks’ matched book
repo activity relative to their trading book.
We also propose a novel and accessible way of estimating the collateral
multiplier, using the Primary Dealer Statistics of New York Fed. The empirical results reported largely support the narrative account of the idealized
29

models.

30

Appendix
The two multiplier processes can be formalized in order to get an understanding of the economic processes at work. The mathematics may help
instructors explain the principles involved.

7.1

Money multiplier

We can formalize the money multiplier in a system with multiple banks to
illustrate the deposit creation process. The desired reserve ratio is RE/D =
1/µ so a bank’s excess reserves will be RE − (1/µ)D. Now let the central
bank buy bonds from the household sector in an open market operation so
the immediate effect is a payment from the central bank to the household
that is deposited in a bank: ∆B m = −∆B h = ∆D. The deposit results in
that bank receiving more reserves or ∆RE = ∆D = ∆B m . Now the bank
has new excess reserves equal to ∆B m (1 − 1/µ) which it will want to use to
buy a corresponding amount of bonds from the household sector. But this
results in a deposit, perhaps in a second bank, of a corresponding amount.
The second bank also receives new reserves when the transaction settles and
now has excess reserves equal to ∆B m (1 − 1/µ)2 . This second bank will use
the excess reserves to buy a corresponding amount of bonds from households,
resulting in yet another deposit and transfer of reserves to a third bank.
We can formalize this process by writing down the sequence of increases
in deposits, starting with the initial open market purchase:
∆D = ∆B m + ∆B m (

µ−1 2
µ−1
) + ∆B m (
) + ....
µ
µ

This expression simplifies to
∆D = µ∆B m
which is the basic money multiplier equation. The math and economic intuition works for an open market sale just as well, in which case ∆B m < 0.
In this case, the operation creates a reserve deficit that is resolved by selling
bonds to the household sector. Starting with a central bank purchase (or
sale) of bonds directly from a bank leads to the same result.
With multiple banks, each step in the process involves the redistribution
of new reserves among the banks as each bond purchase results in a deposit
and reserve transfer in another bank. If there were a single Wicksellian bank,
31

it would be able to anticipate exactly how many bonds to buy from the
households in order to restore its desired reserve ratio and achieve portfolio
balance in one fell swoop since ∆B b = (µ − 1)∆RE. In this case, the reserves
injected by the open market operation stay on the books of the Wicksellian
bank.

7.2

Collateral multiplier

In the case of the collateral multiplier, we can assume the central bank buys a
bond (∆B m ) from the dealer to simplify; considering the case of a purchase
from the hedge fund or both leads to the same result. The dealer banks
are assumed to keep the ratio of their trading book to their matched book
constant as this is the accounting assumption underlying the collateral multiplier. The dealer who sells the bond to the central bank will thus buy a bond
from the hedge fund to restore this ratio, ∆B hf = −∆B m . It’s net change
in bondholdings is zero. But this will cause the the hedge fund to reduce
its repo financing from perhaps another dealer by a corresponding amount.
Then that dealer will make a correction to its balance sheet by selling some
bonds back to another hedge fund. This dealer aims to keep matched book
repo proportional to its bond holdings, RM = (c − 1)B d . Thus, its sales in
this step will be −∆B m /(c − 1). Again this will not succeed in achieving
portfolio balance since the hedge fund buying these securities now steps up
its repo funding, leading to a subsequent purchase of bonds by another dealer
equal to ∆B m /(c − 1)2 . This process of alternating sales and purchases of
bonds by the dealers and hedge funds will eventually resolve itself as the
transactions become smaller and smaller.
The collateral multiplier process can be expressed as two convergent alternating series, one for the dealer bank and another for the hedge fund:
1
1 2
) + ∆B m (
) ....
c−1
c−1
1
1 2
∆B hf = −∆B m + ∆B m (
) − ∆B m (
) ....
c−1
c−1
These expressions simplify to
∆B d = 0 − ∆B m (

−1
∆B m
c
1−c
=
∆B m .
c

∆B d =
∆B hf
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To check for consistency, notice that ∆B d + ∆B hf = −∆B m . Also notice
that ∆S = c∆B d = −∆B m = −∆D. This illustrates that the money market
mutual fund is redeeming shares for the household sector (“cash PM”) and
forcing it to use deposits at the narrow banking sector. A more sophisticated
model might explore how changes in the price of deposits and mutual fund
shares would facilitate this portfolio adjustment. Finally, if we considered a
Wicksellian dealer bank (one monopoly dealer) we could get to the end of
the collateral process in one motion.

7.3

Details of the Infante-Saravay model

As mentioned in the text, the Infante-Saravay model can be solved for a
discrete number, k, of dealer banks. It is convenient to let dealer one’s
trading book equal unity, B1 = 1, to reduce clutter. Since the kth bank has
no one to lend to, its matched book repo is by definition zero, and it uses
the repo borrowing from the k − 1th bank to fund its bond holdings; it is
essentially a hedge fund. Thus, another convenience is to define j = k − 1.
With these conventions, we can pin down the balance sheets of the dealer
banks from 1 through j and the hedge fund, k. The ith dealer bank’s bond
position and trading book is
i−1



c−1
c



(c − 1)i
ci−1

RT =
and its matched book is.
RM =


.

The kth bank thus holds bonds funded by its repo borrowing so we can
call it a hedge fund. (Note that Bk is analogous to hedge fund bondholdings,
B hf .)


(c − 1)j
.
Bk =
cj−1
The total bonds in this system remain a constant multiple of dealer one’s
position: B = cB1 . The basic model in section 2 sets k = 2, so there is just
one dealer and one hedge fund. As the number of layers, k, increases, bonds
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are shifted out of the hedge fund and onto the dealers’ balance sheet but the
total stays constant. We can see this by evaluating (recall that B1 = 1)
d

B + Bk =

i−1
k 
X
c−1
1

c


+

(c − 1)j
cj−1


= c.

This generalizes to B d + Bk = cB1 . Note that as k → ∞, the hedge fund
vanishes and all the bonds have moved to the balance sheet of the dealer
banks, funded by money fund repo, as all the interdealer repo remains within
the dealer system. Thus we can see that as k increases the total amount of
shadow money created outside the dealer network remains constant, S =
B d + Bk = cB1 .
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